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§ 21.01

§ 21.01 Introduction* **
On January 6, 2014—nearly a year-and-a-half before declaring his candidacy—Donald J. Trump appeared by phone on the television program
Fox & Friends. When asked about climate change, Trump responded:
Well, it’s a hoax. I think the scientists are having a lot of fun . . . . The problem
we’re doing is we’re making our manufacturing . . . non-competitive . . . . And
if you look at what’s going on in China, if you look at what’s going on in India,
they’re not spending ten cents in their factories, and then we’re supposed to compete. And you can’t compete when you can’t use fuel.1

And thus, in less than 30 seconds, Trump summarized what soon would
become the crux of his energy policy as President of the United States.
For those concerned about climate change, the Trump administration’s
energy policy is alarming. It aims to unravel every corner of the Obama
administration’s climate legacy, consistent with an overall sweep of deregulation. Substantively, the Trump policy also departs starkly from the
approach of the last decade, embracing traditional energy sources—fossil
fuels and nuclear power—above all else.
* Cite as Lincoln L. Davies, Tyler Hubbard & Christopher Sanders, “Trump, Energy
Policy, and Hard Look Review,” 64 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 21-1 (2018).
** Lincoln L. Davies is the Hugh B. Brown Presidential Endowed Chair in Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. An
internationally recognized expert in energy law and policy, Professor Davies is co-author
of one of the nation’s leading energy law casebooks, Energy Law and Policy (2d ed. 2018), as
well as co-author with Joseph Tomain of an international treatise on U.S. energy law, Energy
Law in the United States of America (2015). He has written extensively on energy, environmental, and administrative law, and in particular on renewables and alternative energy,
rooftop solar, renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs, nuclear energy, carbon
capture and sequestration, and regulatory and technology innovation.

Tyler Hubbard is the Faust Research Fellow, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of
Utah.
Christopher Sanders is the Quinney Research Fellow, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah.
The authors are indebted to David Adelman, John Cossa, Keith Rizzardi, Peter Schaumberg, and Amy Wildermuth for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Emily Aplin,
Melissa Bernstein, Suzanne Darais, Kerry Lohmeier, and Kiley Tilby for research assistance.
A portion of this chapter draws on speeches Professor Davies gave for the Australian Institute of Energy (AIE) in July and August 2017. He is grateful to both AIE and the Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation for the opportunity to address this important topic and,
in particular, to John Blik, Steve Blume, Samantha Christie, Penny Crossley, David Deisley,
Margo MacDonnell, Murray Meaton, James Prest, Charles Rendigs, Alex Ritchie, Albert
Thompson, and Shawn Welch.
1 “Fox Regular Donald Trump Decries Climate Change ‘Hoax’: Attributes Climate Warnings to Scientists ‘Having a Lot of Fun,’ ” Media Matters (from Fox News’ Fox & Friends (Jan.
6, 2014, 9:49 AM)), https://mediamatters.org/video/2014/01/06/fox-regular-donald-trump
-decries-climate-change/197432.
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For those who favor President Trump’s overarching political vision,
however, there is much to applaud in this approach. The Trump energy
policy aligns directly with his economic philosophy. As he noted on Fox
& Friends, in his view, energy drives economic progress—and economic
progress translates directly to international political power. Consequently,
the Trump energy policy clutches at its heart the idea that returning to
old energy patterns will resurrect a halcyon version of the United States:
a middle-class-rich industrial export economy buoyed by U.S.-owned,
U.S.-extracted, and U.S.-made energy.
To bring this vision to life, President Trump now is doing what the
quasi-celebrity television commentator who appeared on Fox & Friends
never could. Swiftly and definitively, he has launched an all-out deregulatory offensive. At one level, this offensive feels unparalleled. It is, at least,
unmatched since the Reagan era. At another level, it is hardly anything new.
As the U.S. Supreme Court observed over 50 years ago, federal agencies “do
not establish rules of conduct to last forever,” but rather, “adapt their rules
and practices to the Nation’s needs in a volatile, changing economy.”2
The Trump administration’s moves on energy thus beg the question:
What limits, if any, does this policy approach face?
This chapter begins to answer that question. Employing the lens of arbitrary and capricious, or “hard look,” review from administrative law, the
chapter outlines principles that may constrain the Trump administration
going forward—as well as areas where the administration has room to
move.
Our contributions are threefold. First, we detail the pentagonal principles that define the Trump energy policy (yes, there is a policy). Second,
we establish that this policy is highly political in nature, in that it both
predates Trump’s time in office and is connected to very specific projects
and rules (even if that focus is short- rather than long-term). Third, we
summarize the administration’s efforts to date and then explain the ways
in which hard look review is likely (or unlikely) to throw up barriers to
those actions.
Four sections comprise the remainder of the chapter. Section 21.02
describes the Trump energy policy. Section 21.03 summarizes the actions
the Trump administration has taken to implement this policy. Section
21.04 details the hard look doctrine and applies it, conceptually, to the
Trump energy policy. Section 21.05 concludes.

2 Am.

Trucking Ass’ns v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967).
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§ 21.02

§ 21.02 Trump Energy Policy in Context
For decades, a favorite pastime of U.S. politicians has been declaring that
our nation has “no” energy policy.3 From Jimmy Carter to George W.
Bush, the refrain is all too common. The echoes are so similar they are
almost eerie. “Our country now,” President Carter intoned in 1976, “has no
comprehensive energy program or policy.”4 In 2000, President George W.
Bush readily agreed: “[O]ur country has a great and urgent need for a comprehensive energy policy . . . . Today, America has no energy policy . . . .”5
Given this long tradition, the Trump administration’s approach marks
a stark contrast. Out of the gate, Donald J. Trump—first the social media
commenter, then the candidate, and now the President—has taken a different path from his predecessors. His claim has not been that the nation lacks
an energy policy, either literally or by invoking the claim to demand change
in a quasi-veiled way.6 Rather, President Trump asserts that the nation’s
policy under President Obama was flawed—and that it must be replaced
by a new and better version, a policy that, as he says, puts “America first.”7
Perhaps it should not be surprising that President Trump has been so
upfront about his energy agenda. Certainly his administration has not
been coy about its aims in other contexts.8 Still, early on, the suggestion
that the Trump administration had a coherent energy policy often was
met as a somewhat startling revelation. Now, that reaction has subsided,
as the administration’s efforts over the last year-and-a-half have etched the
policy’s contours more plainly into view.
What is remarkable is that this policy did not crystallize during the campaign or even as the Trump presidency began. Instead, it arose from a loose
conglomeration of ideas espoused by Donald Trump long before he was
a serious contender for the White House. In short: There is a direct and
unbroken line that can be traced from what the Trump administration is
3 See Lincoln L. Davies, “Tracing U.S. Renewable Energy Policy,” 43 Envtl. L. Rep. News
& Analysis 10320, 10321 (2013).
4 Comm’n on Presidential Debates, “The First Carter-Ford Presidential Debate” (Sept.
23, 1976), http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=september-23-1976-debate-transcript.
5 George W. Bush, Speech in Saginaw, Michigan: A Comprehensive National Energy
Policy (Sept. 29, 2000) (transcript available at https://archive.li/o5aB1).
6 See, e.g., Davies, supra note 3; Joseph P. Tomain, “The Dominant Model of United
States Energy Policy,” 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 355 (1990).
7 See Fact Sheet, White House, “President Donald J. Trump’s Foreign Policy Puts America First” (Jan. 30, 2018).
8 See Carol E. Lee, “Trump’s Bluntness Unsettles World Leaders,” Wall St. J. (Feb. 3,
2017). But cf. Bruce Brown & Selina MacLaren, “Holding the Presidency Accountable: A
Path Forward for Journalists and Lawyers,” 12 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 89, 95 (2018) (noting the
Trump administration’s lack of transparency).
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doing on energy today, back to the promises Trump the candidate made,
and then back even further to years of Trump’s ubiquitous social media
commentary.
This revelation—that the Trump energy policy has been extraordinarily
consistent over time—is almost as important as context for understanding
the policy as is detailing the content of the policy itself. It highlights how
fully and thoroughly political the policy is—a fact that parties might rely
on in trying to show that the policy shifts are untethered to the factual or
scientific record.

[1] Early Days
Historians of a prior generation may either bemoan or marvel (or both)
at reliance on 140- and 280-character missives as the primary source of a
president’s thoughts. But for someone who was not a public figure in any
real sense prior to taking office, this, for now, is as good as it gets. Both the
seeds and the roots of the Trump energy policy rest primarily in tweets.
The tweets are telling. Long before 2016, Mr. Trump lamented that the
United States was not using its energy resources to play a larger—or different—role on the world economic stage. In September 2011, he declared: “If
China had a tenth of the natural resources we do then they would already
be energy independent. Instead we continue to buy oil from OPEC.”9 The
theme then continued. Just over a year later, Trump wrote: “Technology has
shown we have tremendous energy resources right under our feet . . . .”10
Then, the next month, this: “If we do not win energy as a country, we just
do not win, period!”11
These ideas—that the United States needs to be not just energy independent but also ascendant, and that this kind of energy ascendancy equates to
global economic domination—would later become the centerpiece of the
Trump energy policy. He both foreshadowed and drove home the point in
a 2014 missive: “If America unlocked its energy potential, we would once
again be the most powerful country in the world.”12
Within this framework, three unconnected energy ideas consistently ran throughout Mr. Trump’s pre-presidency social media political
9 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Sept. 16, 2011, 2:20 PM), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/114811039996063744.
10 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Sept. 19, 2012, 7:59 AM), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/248436233041215488.
11 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Oct. 17, 2012, 7:55 AM), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/258566974085423104.
12 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Apr. 21, 2014, 1:24 PM), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/458340513486475264.
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commentary. First, he repeatedly suggested that government regulation
needlessly limits the energy industry. That was precisely the conclusion he
used for his 2014 tweet asserting that energy could make the United States
“the most powerful country in the world.” That dream is possible, Trump
said, but “Washington is holding us back.”13 Less than two months later, he
revisited the point: “Obama’s war on coal is killing American jobs, making us more energy dependent on our enemies & creating a great business
disadvantage.”14
Second, Trump was unabashed about what energy sources he wanted
to pick as winners. In his eyes, this was quite simple: Established energy
sources—fossil fuels and nuclear power—are good. Emergent energy
sources—renewables—are too expensive, unreliable, and bad. As Trump
wrote in 2011, “OPEC is ripping us off on oil. We are ripping ourselves off
by investing in unproven green energy.”15 The refrain was so common he
even noted it himself. “Should have gone after the oil years ago,” Trump
tweeted in late 2015, “like I have been saying.”16 Thus, in Trump’s mind,
energy choices were easy and clear. “Fracking poses ZERO health risks”
and “increases our national security by making us energy independent,”
he said.17 The Keystone XL Pipeline should be built because it “will create
20,000 jobs and lower gas prices. But Obama says No. Dumb.”18 By contrast, renewables could only cause problems in Trump’s view. The Obama
administration, Trump said, “pissed away” billions of dollars on “ ‘green
energy’ failures.”19 “It is a shame Keystone wasn’t powered by solar panels
and wind because then @BarackObama would have wasted billions on it,”
he lamented in 2012.20 And Trump repeatedly voiced his distaste for wind
energy, perhaps colored by his feud with a wind project near his golf course

13 Id.
14 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (June 3, 2014, 11:32 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/473895061747695616.
15 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Sept. 23, 2011, 10:56 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/117296270682497024.
16 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Dec. 6, 2015, 5:28 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/673675346030542848.
17 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (May 1, 2013, 12:17 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/329676026382790656.
18 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Dec. 27, 2011, 12:53 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/151767567604781058.
19 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Apr. 25, 2013, 12:49 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/327509770716213248.
20 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jan. 24, 2012, 12:27 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/161908088851529728.
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in Scotland.21 “Wind turbines are ripping your country apart and killing
tourism. Electric bills in Scotland are skyrocketing-stop the madness,”
Trump tweeted in March 2014.22
Third, Trump consistently expressed skepticism about climate change
and its role in energy policy. Sometimes these views confused basic definitional differences between weather and climate, such as his tweet from
February 2014: “Massive record setting snowstorm and freezing temperatures in U.S. Smart that GLOBAL WARMING hoaxsters changed name to
CLIMATE CHANGE! $$$$.”23 Often, the tweets falsely implied (or flatly
stated) that climate change lacks scientific support, such as his tweet from
January 2014: “Give me clean, beautiful and healthy air - not the same old
climate change (global warming) bullshit!”24 And always, they saw the idea
of regulating climate change as antithetical to his economic views. “The
concept of global warming,” Trump famously tweeted in November 2012,
“was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing
non-competitive.”25

[2] Candidacy
As the Trump presidential candidacy took shape, so too did its energy
policy. And as that policy emerged, it was hard not to notice that it sprang
directly from the scattered political claims on energy that Mr. Trump had
been reciting in the years prior.
By far, Mr. Trump’s most important speech on energy as a presidential candidate came the same day he reached the threshold of delegates
to clinch the Republican nomination. It was May 26, 2016, in Bismarck,
North Dakota. Using the Williston Basin Petroleum Conference as a platform to announce his plan, Trump outlined an energy policy that aligned
almost point for point with his earlier social media commentary.
Trump began by reemphasizing the idea that energy wealth is linked to
economic wealth—and that economic wealth determines global political

21 See, e.g., Philip Bump, “Trump’s Decade-Long Fight with Scotland Is Why He Thinks
Putin Wanted Clinton to Win,” Wash. Post (July 12, 2017).
22 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Mar. 19, 2014, 5:00 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/446436045178302464.
23 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Feb. 5, 2014, 2:57 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/431018674695442432.
24 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jan. 28, 2014, 10:44 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/428418323660165120.
25 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:15 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385.
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power. “A Trump administration will develop an America First energy
plan,” Trump proclaimed. “America first, folks, America first!”26
He then hinted at a theme he would later emphasize as president. Prior
administrations repeatedly had called for the United States to become
“energy independent.”27 Trump, however, saw that goal as too low. Instead,
he suggested the United States should seek energy “dominance.” He
explained: “[H]ere is how we’re going to do it. And here is how this plan
will make America wealthy again. American energy dominance will be
declared a strategic economic and foreign policy goal of the United States.
It’s about time.”28 This, Trump said, was possible because the United States
enjoys tremendous energy wealth. “We’re loaded,’ ” Trump repeatedly
exclaimed in Bismarck. “[W]e didn’t even know it. We’re loaded! We had
no idea how rich we were. We’re richer than all of ’em . . . .”29
With these broad objectives in place, Mr. Trump then laid out what
he called his 100-day energy action plan. Consistent with his previously
expressed views, this plan focused on promoting fossil fuels, rolling back
Obama-era regulations, and stepping away from efforts to engage in climate mitigation. “[W]e’re going to rescind all the job-destroying Obama
executive actions, including the Climate Action Plan,” Trump declared.
“[O]kay? Remember that. We’re going to save the coal industry! We’re
gonna save that coal industry! Believe me, we’re gonna save it! I love those
people - these are great people!”30 In particular, Trump indicated that he
wanted to pave the way for the Keystone XL Pipeline, going so far as to say
he would specifically “ask Trans-Canada to renew its permit application.”31
He also said that he would “lift moratoriums on energy production in federal areas,” “revoke policies that impose unwarranted restrictions on new
drilling technologies,” and “cancel” the Paris Climate Agreement.32

26 Donald Trump, Speech at Williston Basin Petroleum Conf. in Bismarck, N.D., May
26, 2016: An America First Energy Plan, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
kxq9lBnv0cs (transcript available at http://www.astrologicaltools.com/energy).
27 See Michael Burger, “Recovering from the Recovery Narrative: On Glocalism, Green
Jobs and Cyborg Civilization,” 46 Akron L. Rev. 909, 919 (2013).
28 Trump,

supra note 26.

29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.; see also Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., “An America First Energy Plan,”
https://web.archive.org/web/20161110003503/https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/
energy/.
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[3] Presidency
By the time Mr. Trump was sworn into office, then, the energy policy he
was espousing was clear. It was built on five pillars. First, above all else, was
the idea of promoting U.S. energy production and exports, consistent with
his overall “America first” approach to economic and foreign affairs. Second was an underlying assumption that U.S. energy sources are not meaningfully limited, such that both energy “independence” and “dominance”
are possible. Next was the idea that an onslaught of regulatory rollbacks
was needed to achieve these goals. The fourth pillar of his policy was the
promotion of fossil fuels and a concomitant distaste for renewables. And
last was a strong version of explicit climate skepticism, namely, that any
regulation seeking to rein in climate change is inappropriate by definition.
While this policy was plain as Mr. Trump took office, the President further etched it into place in June 2017, when he gave his second key speech
on energy to date, at an event entitled Unleashing American Energy during the administration’s “Energy Week.” In the speech, President Trump
drew even clearer connections between his energy and economic policies.
Repeatedly referencing fossil fuels, he asserted: “The truth is that we have
near-limitless supplies of energy in our country. . . . We have nearly 100
years’ worth of natural gas and more than 250 years’ worth of clean, beautiful coal.”33 This, Trump said, puts the United States “really in the driving seat” because energy wealth is the key to international power.34 Thus,
U.S. energy wealth, he said, will unlock “a true energy revolution” that in
turn will promote national “sovereignty” and economic progress.35 “With
these incredible resources, my administration will seek not only American
energy independence that we’ve been looking for so long, but American
energy dominance. And we’re going to be an exporter—exporter. We
will be dominant. We will export American energy all over the world, all
around the globe.”36
Thus the fully political nature of the Trump administration’s energy
policy was laid bare. Not only was the policy moored in the overarching
themes on which President Trump had run for office, it was expressly
pitched as a direct response to the prior administration. Not only did the
policy try to recast the world of energy as something different from what
had actually developed over prior decades, it sought to speak specifically
to constituencies that had been harmed by the increasing globalization and
33 Remarks, White House, “Remarks by President Trump at the Unleashing American
Energy Event” (June 29, 2017).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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technologization of the economy. And not only did the policy lay out broad
objectives that were political in nature, it named specific programs, projects, and regulations it would target in pursuit of those goals—irrespective
of the government’s prior factual determinations that such policies were
needed.

§ 21.03 Trump Energy Policy in Action
Presaged by the announcement of its 100-day energy action plan in
Bismarck, the Trump administration wasted little time putting its policy
into place. The President, virtually on being sworn into office, issued three
executive orders to begin the play.
The second was the most important. Entitled “Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth” and issued March 28, 2017, Executive
Order No. 13,783 mandated a bevy of actions centered on undoing the
Obama administration’s work.37 It rescinded President Obama’s Climate
Action Plan38 and connected orders, including guidance on how to
account for climate change in federal environmental reviews.39 It ordered
federal agencies to review and potentially roll back a wide array of regulations, including the Clean Power Plan, the Obama administration’s moratorium on federal coal leasing, and rules on methane and other climate
change emissions in the oil and gas sector. And it compelled agency heads
to evaluate “all existing regulations, orders, guidance documents,” and
other agency actions that “potentially burden the development or use of
domestically produced energy resources, with particular attention to oil,
natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources.”40 Thus the order declared
it in the national interest to develop “our Nation’s vast energy resources”
and to reduce “regulatory burdens that unnecessarily encumber energy
production . . . .”41 In short, the order formalized the President’s Bismarck
energy policy—a policy that equates traditional energy development with
economic success.
The other two executive orders pursued complementary tactics. Executive Order No. 13,776, issued January 24, 2017, and entitled “Expediting
Environmental Reviews and Approvals for High Priority Infrastructure
Projects,” created a process by which state governors and federal agency
37 Exec.

Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017).

38 Exec.

Office of the President, “The President’s Climate Action Plan” (June 2013).

39 The

plan sought to “slow the effects of climate change” by cutting carbon emissions.
Id. at 5. The plan consisted of “a wide variety of executive actions.” Id. In conjunction with
the plan, the Council on Environmental Quality also issued guidance for considering
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in NEPA reviews. See 81 Fed. Reg. 51,866 (Aug. 5, 2016).
40 Exec.
41 Id.

Order No. 13,783, § 2(a).

§ 1(a).
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heads could request “high priority” expedited review of energy and other
infrastructure projects.42 Executive Order No. 13,795, issued April 28,
2017, and entitled “Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy
Strategy,” declared it national policy to “encourage energy exploration and
production, including on the Outer Continental Shelf [(OCS)], in order
to maintain the Nation’s position as a global energy leader.”43 This order
reversed certain limits on offshore oil and gas leasing and commanded the
review of multiple rules and designations applicable to the industry.
The stage was set, then, for the Trump administration to put its energy
policy into action. The action was immediate. During his first week in
office, the President, first, formally invited TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP to “promptly re-submit its application to the Department of
State” to construct the Keystone XL Pipeline44 and, second, directed the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to “take all actions necessary and
appropriate” to “review and approve in an expedited manner” the Dakota
Access Pipeline (DAPL) project.45 Two months later to the day, the Secretary of State granted a presidential permit for the Keystone XL Pipeline.46
Then, in even less time, the Corps green-lighted the DAPL project.47 A few
months later, the President announced that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement because it “punishes the United
States . . . while imposing no meaningful obligations on the world’s leading polluters.”48 “I was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh,” the
President declared, “not Paris.”49
The administration’s orientation was thus clear. It put the public on
notice that its actions would be swift and numerous—and that it would
42 Exec.

Order No. 13,766, 82 Fed. Reg. 8657 (Jan. 24, 2017).

43 Exec.

Order No. 13,795, § 2, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,815 (Apr. 28, 2017).

44 Presidential

Memorandum on Construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline § 2, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8663 (Jan. 24, 2017).
45 Presidential Memorandum on Construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline § 2(a), 82
Fed. Reg. 11,129 (Jan. 24, 2017).
46 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, “Issuance of Presidential Permit to TransCanada for
Keystone XL Pipeline” (Mar. 24, 2017).
47 See Memorandum from Paul D. Cramer, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of the Army, to Hon.
Raul Grijalva, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 7, 2017) (notice to Congress and others
of the Corps’ intent to grant an easement for DAPL for 30 years); News Release, Corps,
“Corps Grants Easement to Dakota Access, LLC” (Feb. 8, 2017); Notice of Termination of
Intent to Prepare an EIS in Connection with Dakota Access, LLC’s Request for an Easement
to Cross Lake Oahe, North Dakota, 82 Fed. Reg. 11,021 (Feb. 17, 2017).
48 Remarks, White House, “Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord”
(June 1, 2017).
49 Id.
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vigorously seek to promote domestic fossil fuels and traditional industry
while erasing all regulations focused on climate change, just as the President had promised on the campaign trail. It also highlighted the trajectory
these actions would follow: They would provoke extensive litigation,50 and
their symbolic value would often exceed their actual impact.
Indeed, the Trump administration’s energy actions to date are so frequent, copious, and divergent, they defy easy summary. Here, then, we
focus on the five most prominent categories of action so far: onshore and
offshore oil and gas development, federal coal leasing, the Clean Power
Plan, and vehicle fuel efficiency standards.

[1] Onshore Oil and Gas Development
The Trump administration’s actions to promote onshore oil and gas
development trace directly to the President’s “energy independence”
executive order. That order directed the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and the Secretary of the Interior to review—and presumably unravel—a series of Obama-era rules designed to reduce greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions from this industry.51 The agencies wasted little time.
Already, they have sought to delay, revoke, and replace both of the Obama
administration’s key rules in this realm: the Waste Prevention Rule, plus a
separate set of EPA regulations on fugitive methane and other emissions.

[a] Waste Prevention Rule
Arguably the most critical onshore oil and gas rule targeted by the Trump
administration is the Waste Prevention Rule.52 Promulgated in November
2016, this rule aimed to limit methane and other fugitive gas emissions
from all onshore oil and gas projects on federal and tribal lands. When the
Obama administration adopted the rule, data showed that these projects
vented, flared, or otherwise lost enough natural gas in the prior six years to
“supply about 6.2 million households for a year.”53
The rule thus implemented a goal of reducing methane leakage in federal
and tribal oil and gas projects by 2026.54 Specifically, the rule required
50 See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, N. Plains
Res. Council v. Shannon, No. 4:17-cv-00031 (D. Mont. Aug. 4, 2017); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 4:17-cv00029 (D. Mont. Mar. 27, 2017); Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. Corps, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101
(D.D.C. 2017) (order on cross-motions for partial summary judgment).
51 Exec.

Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017).

52 Waste

Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 81
Fed. Reg. 83,008 (Nov. 18, 2016) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3100, 3160, 3170).
53 Fact
54 81

Sheet, BLM, “Methane Waste Prevention Rule,” at 1 (Nov. 15, 2016).

Fed. Reg. at 83,011.
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oil and gas operators to capture specific percentages of produced natural
gas, measure how much they flare, develop waste minimization plans,
and upgrade or replace certain equipment.55 The rule also redefined what
counted as “unavoidably lost” and “avoidably lost” oil and gas (i.e., “waste”),
and imposed limits on venting and flaring.56
Out of the gate, the Trump administration sought to reverse the Waste
Prevention Rule. The first avenue it pursued was the Congressional Review
Act.57 That effort initially gained some traction, passing the House 221 to
191.58 Ultimately, however, the effort foundered in the Senate, failing on a
49 to 51 vote.59
Unmoved, the Trump administration turned to executive action instead.
On June 15, 2017, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued a notice
stating that it would postpone compliance dates for several portions of the
rule pending resolution of litigation challenging the rule in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming.60 The BLM claimed it had authority to postpone implementation under section 705 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). That provision allows an agency, when “justice so
requires,” to “postpone the effective date of action taken by it, pending
judicial review.”61 “Considering the substantial cost that complying with
these requirements poses to operators,” the BLM wrote, “and the uncertain
future these requirements face in light of the pending litigation,” postponement was appropriate.62
Almost immediately, the BLM’s effort devolved into a legal ping-pong
match. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California found
the BLM’s delay unlawful.63 Then, the very next day, the BLM proposed

55 Id.
56 Id.
57 5

at 83,011, 83,047–48.

U.S.C. §§ 801–808.

58 H.R.J.

Res. 36, 115th Cong. (2017).

59 See

Juliet Eilperin & Chelsea Harvey, “Senate Unexpectedly Rejects Bid to Repeal a
Key Obama-Era Environmental Regulation,” Wash. Post (May 10, 2017).
60 The postponement applied only to the portions of the rule that were not already in
effect.
61 5 U.S.C § 705; see also Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and
Resource Conservation; Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,430
(June 15, 2017).
62 82

Fed. Reg. at 27,431.

63 California

v. BLM, 277 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (order granting plaintiffs’
motions for summary judgment).
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a new postponement until January 17, 2019.64 This time, the BLM abandoned its APA § 705 argument and instead cited a slate of statutes it said
gave the agency “inherent” authority “to modify or otherwise revise the
existing regulation in response to substantive concerns regarding cost and
feasibility . . . .”65
This, though, was not the end of the volley. On February 22, 2018, the
Northern District of California found this new delay also arbitrary and
capricious and enjoined the postponement.66 “[The BLM] must provide
at least some basis,” the court wrote, “indeed, a ‘detailed justification’—to
explain why it is changing course after its three years of study and deliberation resulting in the Waste Prevention Rule.”67
Still undeterred, the Trump administration deployed a third strategy for
lifting the rule. On the same day the court struck down the BLM’s second
attempt at postponement, the agency proposed a new rule to replace the
Obama administration’s version.68 Specifically, this proposal would rescind
key provisions of the Waste Prevention Rule and make other changes.
First, it would terminate the waste capture percentage requirements on the
grounds that they are “overly complex and ultimately ineffective at reducing flaring.”69 Second, it would withdraw the waste minimization, leak
detection, equipment repair, and reporting requirements on the grounds
that compliance costs “outweigh the value of their conservation effects.”70
Third, the proposal would return to the pre-Obama standards for determining when gas is “avoidably” or “unavoidably” lost—and change the
venting prohibition to a venting “limitation” that gives operators significant leeway to vent or flare gas much as they had in the past.71
The BLM set a deadline of April 23, 2018, for public comments on its
proposal. Meanwhile, the Trump administration notched a victory. On
64 Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Delay
and Suspension of Certain Requirements, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,458 (proposed Oct. 5, 2017) (to
be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3160, 3170).
65 Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation;
Delay and Suspension of Certain Requirements, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,050, 58,059 (Dec. 8, 2017)
(to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3160, 3170).
66 California v. BLM, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (order denying motion to
transfer venue and granting preliminary injunction).
67 Id.

at 1068.

68 Waste

Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation;
Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 7924 (proposed Feb. 22, 2018)
(to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3160, 3170).
69 Id.

at 7930.

70 Id.

at 7932.

71 Id.

at 7933–34.
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April 4, 2018, in response to a request from the BLM, the District of Wyoming enjoined multiple provisions of the Waste Prevention Rule.72 Two
days later, California and New Mexico appealed that decision to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.73

[b] Fugitive Methane and Volatile Organic
Compound Emission Limits
To complement the Waste Prevention Rule, the Obama EPA also issued
limits on fugitive GHG and volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions
for new oil and gas drilling, including hydraulically fractured sites.74 This
rule imposed a wide array of requirements to limit methane and VOC
emissions, including 95% methane emission reductions at well sites, zero
natural gas bleed rates at processing plants, and zero natural gas emissions
at processing pumps.75
Quickly—though less successfully than with the Waste Prevention
Rule—the Trump administration sought to lift these requirements as well.
First, the EPA initiated a review and gave advanced notice of a forthcoming rulemaking, suggesting that the Obama-era rule was too costly.76
Then, two months later, the EPA stayed the Obama rules twice, first for 90
days,77 and 10 days later, for two years.78 To justify these actions, the EPA
cited “uncertainties” regarding the rule’s application.79
This effort, however, kept for only about a month. On July 3, 2017, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the EPA’s stay, rejecting

72 Wyoming v. DOI, No. 2:16-cv-00285 (D. Wyo. Apr. 4, 2018) (order staying
implementation of rule provisions and staying action pending finalization of revision rule).
73 State Respondents’ Notice of Appeal, Wyoming v. DOI, No. 2:16-cv-00285 (D. Wyo.
Apr. 6, 2018).
74 Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824 (June 3, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
75 Id.

at 35,826.

76 See

Review of the 2016 Oil and Gas New Source Performance Standards for New,
Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,331 (Apr. 4, 2017); see also Letter
from E. Scott Pruitt, EPA Adm’r, to Howard J. Feldman et al., “Convening a Proceeding for
Reconsideration of Final Rule, ‘Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New,
Reconstructed and Modified Sources,’ published June 3, 2016, 81 Fed. Reg. 35824” (Apr.
18, 2017).
77 Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources; Grant of Reconsideration and Partial Stay, 82 Fed. Reg. 25,730 (June 5, 2017).
78 Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources: Stay of Certain Requirements, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,645 (proposed June 16, 2017)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
79 82

Fed. Reg. at 25,733.
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the agency’s claim that it had “ ‘inherent authority’ to ‘issue a brief stay.’ ”80
The EPA, wrote the court, “cites nothing for the proposition that it has
such authority, and for good reason . . . . [The Clean Air Act] confers no
such authority.”81 Accordingly, the court ordered the Obama-era rule to be
implemented beginning July 31, 2017.82

[2] Offshore Oil and Gas Development
The Trump administration’s actions to date for offshore resources are
more focused on encouraging production than reducing costs. The efforts
fall into two key categories: expanding the portion of the OCS open for
drilling and reviewing prior national marine sanctuary and marine
national monument designations.83

[a] Outer Continental Shelf Drilling Areas
For decades, the portion of the OCS open to offshore drilling has been
quite limited.84 Of the four broad regions of the OCS—the Alaskan, Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific—only the Gulf of Mexico is widely open to
new drilling. Most portions of the others have not seen new leases issued
since the 1980s.85 This trend began when President George H.W. Bush
issued a drilling moratorium in 1990, later extended by President Clinton,

80 Clean

Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

81 Id.
82 See Mandate Issued to EPA, Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, No. 17-1145 (D.C. Cir. July 31,
2017). Subsequently, the EPA removed two Obama-era fugitive emissions requirements—
the “requirement that leaking components be repaired during unplanned or emergency
shutdowns; and the monitoring survey requirements for well sites located on the Alaskan
North Slope.” Fact Sheet, EPA, “EPA Amends Portion of Fugitive Emissions Requirements
in the 2016 New Source Performance Standards for the Oil and Natural Gas Industry” (Feb.
23, 2018); see also Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed,
and Modified Sources; Amendments, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,628 (Mar. 12, 2018) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
83 Consistent with the offshore executive order’s direction, agencies are also reviewing
offshore well control rules adopted after the Deepwater Horizon disaster. See Oil & Gas and
Sulfur Operations in the OCS—Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control, 81 Fed. Reg.
25,888 (Apr. 29, 2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250); Air Quality Control, Reporting,
and Compliance, 81 Fed. Reg. 19,718 (proposed Apr. 5, 2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt.
550); Oil & Gas and Sulfur Operations on the OCS—Requirements for Exploratory Drilling
on the Arctic OCS, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,478 (July 15, 2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 250,
254, 550).
84 See Hiroko Tabuchi & Tim Wallace, “Trump Would Open Nearly All U.S. Waters
to Drilling. But Will They Drill?” N.Y. Times (Jan. 23, 2018); see also Adam Vann, Cong.
Research Serv., “Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Legal Framework” (CRS Report
RL33404 Apr. 13, 2018).
85 See Am. Petroleum Inst., “Unlocking America’s Offshore Energy,” https://www.api.org/
oil-and-natural-gas/energy-primers/offshore.
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and then augmented by President Obama.86 Thus, while the OCS consists
of approximately 1.8 billion acres, only about 178 million acres are available for oil and gas leasing, and just over 41 million acres are currently
under lease—with only 8 million acres, or less than 0.5% of the OCS, actually producing.87
President Trump’s offshore energy executive order sought to change this.
It specifically aimed to reverse the arguably permanent withdrawals from
leasing that President Obama ordered in 2015 and 2016 for the U.S. Arctic
(the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas) and certain deep canyons in the Atlantic.88 It also directed the Secretary of the Interior to reconsider issuing oil
and gas leases “to the maximum extent permitted by law” in multiple OCS
planning areas.89
This direction had swift effect. On January 8, 2018—eight months after
the President issued the offshore executive order—the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management (BOEM) officially proposed opening all but one
region of the OCS for leasing through 2024.90 This proposal “would make
more than 98 percent of the OCS resources available to consider for oil and
gas leasing during the 2019-2024 period.”91 The agency requested public
comments by March 9, 2018, and noted that it would conduct a programmatic environmental impact review on its planned leasing schedule.92
Already, these actions have engendered litigation. On May 3, 2017, a
coalition of environmental public interest groups filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the executive order’s attempt to undo
86 See Democratic Policy & Commc’ns Comm., U.S. Senate, “Clean Energy Jobs and
Oil Company Accountability Act: Background on Offshore Drilling and Moratoriums,”
https://www.dpc.senate.gov/files_energybill/background_offshore.pdf. President Obama
withdrew 3.8 million acres of the Atlantic region and 115 million acres of the Arctic region
from development. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (DOI), “Secretary Jewell
Applauds President’s Withdrawal of Atlantic and Arctic Ocean Areas from Future Oil and
Gas Leasing” (Dec. 20, 2016).
87 Inst. for Energy Research, “Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Statistics” (June 23, 2008),
http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/outer-continental-shelf-ocs-statistics/.
88 Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,815 (Apr. 28, 2017); see Presidential Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf
Offshore Alaska from Leasing Disposition (Jan. 27, 2015); Presidential Memorandum on
Withdrawal of Certain Areas off the Atlantic Coast on the Outer Continental Shelf from
Mineral Leasing (Dec. 20, 2016).
89 Exec.

Order No. 13,795, § 3(a).

90 See

Notice of Availability of the 2019-2024 Draft Proposed OCS Oil & Gas Leasing
Program and Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic EIS, 83 Fed. Reg. 829 (Jan. 8,
2018).
91 Id.

at 830.

92 Id.

at 829.
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President Obama’s permanent withdrawal from leasing of the Beaufort
and Chukchi Seas and the deep canyon Atlantic areas.93 The parties argue
that while section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act94 gives
authority for presidential withdrawal of unleased OCS lands, it does not
authorize “Presidents to undo such withdrawals.”95 As of this writing, the
lawsuit remains pending. On March 19, 2018, the court denied the government’s various motions to dismiss.96

[b] National Marine Sanctuaries and Marine
National Monuments
In response to the offshore drilling executive order, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) announced that it would
review 11 National Marine Sanctuaries and Marine National Monuments
within the OCS that had been designated or expanded within the last 10
years.97 In total, these areas encompass around 425 million acres.98 NOAA
also invited comments on a variety of factors it would consider, including
costs of managing the areas and overall opportunity costs if the areas are
opened to development.99 In response, NOAA received nearly 100,000
comments, with approximately 99% of those urging the agency to keep the
designations in place.100
In October 2017, NOAA submitted a final report to the White House.
The report, however, remains in interagency review and has not been
made available to the public.101 Several environmental groups have pledged
to sue should the sanctuaries and monuments be eliminated or reduced.102

93 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, League of Conservation Voters v.
Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00101 (D. Alaska May 3, 2017), 2017 WL 1736693.
94 43

U.S.C. § 1341(a).

95 Complaint,
96 League

supra note 93, at 1.

of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d 985 (Mar. 19, 2018).

97 Review of National Marine Sanctuaries and Marine National Monuments Designated
or Expanded Since April 28, 2007, 82 Fed. Reg. 28,827, 28,828 (June 26, 2017).
98 See

id.

99 Id.
100 See Paul Rogers, “Trump Gets Report that Could Open National Marine Sanctuaries
to Oil Drilling,” Mercury News (Oct. 27, 2017).
101 See Valerie Volcovici, “U.S. Marine Sanctuary Oil Drilling Report Sent to Trump, Not
Public,” Reuters (Oct. 25, 2017).
102 See

Rogers, supra note 100.
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[3] Federal Coal Leasing
The Trump administration’s actions on federal coal leasing parallel those
for offshore oil and gas development.103 They are a direct response to the
Obama administration’s withdrawal of federal lands for energy development. They aim to increase fossil fuel production.
These objectives flow directly from the “energy independence” executive
order. That order expressly directed the Secretary of the Interior to “take
all steps necessary and appropriate to amend or withdraw” the Obamaera moratorium on new coal leasing on federal lands.104 The day after
President Trump issued the executive order, Secretary of the Interior Ryan
Zinke signed his own order seeking to implement these goals.105
Specifically, Secretary Zinke’s order both repealed the moratorium
and eliminated the procedural framework undergirding it. In issuing the
moratorium in 2016, then-Secretary Sally Jewell detailed concerns about
coal market conditions and climate change as the grounds for halting new
leases.106 The idea was that while the moratorium was in place, the BLM
would conduct a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) of
the federal coal program, including coal market conditions.107 Prior to this
order, the federal government had not conducted a comprehensive review
of its coal leasing program in nearly four decades.108
Secretary Zinke’s order, however, ended the moratorium and terminated the PEIS effort. Noting that both the moratorium and the PEIS were
103 While we focus here on federal and tribal coal development, the Trump administration has been busy seeking to promote coal in other ways. These efforts include (1) proposing changes to coal ash regulation; (2) repealing a rule that sought to close royalty payment
loopholes; and (3) pursuing a variety of strategies to ensure that coal is used for electricity
production, including by invoking little-used emergency and other statutory provisions.
See News Release, EPA, “EPA Proposes First of Two Rules to Amend Coal Ash Disposal
Regulations, Saving Up To $100M Per Year in Compliance Costs” (Mar. 1, 2018); Repeal
of Consolidated Federal Oil & Gas and Federal & Indian Coal Valuation Reform, 82 Fed.
Reg. 36,934 (Aug. 7, 2017) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 1202, 1206); Stephen Lacey &
Julia Pyper, “DOE’s Grid Reliability Study Is a Rorschach Test for the Future of Electricity,”
Greentech Media (Aug. 23, 2017); Gavin Bade, “ ‘FERC Did Its Job:’ Former Regulators,
Lawyers Laud DOE NOPR Rejection,” Utility Dive (Jan. 9, 2018); White House, “Statement from the Press Secretary on Fuel-Secure Power Facilities” (June 1, 2018); Gavin Bade,
“FERC Regulators: No Security Emergency to Justify DOE Coal, Nuke Bailout,” Utility Dive
(June 12, 2018).
104 Exec. Order No. 13,783, § 6, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017). The moratorium had
limited exceptions, including for metallurgical coal, lease modifications, and emergency
leasing. See Secretarial Order No. 3338, § 6 (Jan. 15, 2016) (SO 3338).
105 Secretarial

Order No. 3348 (Mar. 29, 2017) (SO 3348).

106 SO

3338, supra note 104, at § 2.

107 Id.

§ 5.

108 See

id. § 2.
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discretionary, Secretary Zinke’s two-page order found the moratorium “not
. . . [in] the public interest” and the PEIS unnecessary “to consider potential improvements to the program.”109 The PEIS, in particular, the order
explained, would “cost many millions of dollars and would be completed
no sooner than 2019.”110 Accordingly, Secretary Zinke directed the BLM
to begin “process[ing] coal lease applications and modifications expeditiously” and ordered “[a]ll activities associated with” the PEIS to cease.111
Now, two lawsuits seek to block Secretary Zinke’s actions. First, a coalition of environmental groups along with the Northern Cheyenne Tribe
have filed suit challenging Secretary Zinke’s order as inconsistent with
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).112 Second, four
states—California, New Mexico, New York, and Washington—have challenged the moratorium dissolution as both violative of NEPA113 and inconsistent with the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920114 and the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976.115 Both cases are in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Montana, which has consolidated the suits.116

[4] The Clean Power Plan
Also aiming to promote coal, the Trump administration has sought to
unravel what many hailed as the United States’ “strongest ever climate
action”117—the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan (CPP).118 In
October 2015, after hundreds of meetings, years of deliberation, and millions of public comments,119 the Obama administration finalized this rule
109 SO

3348, supra note 105, at § 4.

110 Id.

§ 3.

111 Id.

§ 5. In addition, Congress rescinded the Stream Protection Rule, which sought to
limit environmental damage from mountaintop removal coal mining. See Stream Protection Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 93,066 (Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified in scattered sections of 30
C.F.R.), disapproved by H.R.J. Res. 38, Pub. L. No. 115-5, 131 Stat. 10 (2017).
112 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Citizens for Clean Energy v. DOI,
No. 4:17-cv-00030 (D. Mont. Mar. 29, 2017), 2017 WL 1173696; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347.
113 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, California v. DOI, No. 4:17-cv00042 (D. Mont. May 9, 2017), 2017 WL 1862941.
114 30

U.S.C. §§ 181–263.

115 43

U.S.C. §§ 1701–1782.

116 Citizens

for Clean Energy v. DOI, No. 4:17-cv-00030 (D. Mont. June 2, 2017) (order
granting motion to consolidate cases).
117 Adam Vaughan, “Obama’s Clean Power Plan Hailed as US’s Strongest Ever Climate
Action,” Guardian (Aug. 3, 2015).
118 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60).
119 Id.

at 64,704.
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seeking to reduce electricity sector GHG emissions by nearly one-third of
2005 levels by 2030.120 Although the CPP’s details were complex, the basic
approach was straightforward: The EPA would set carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions reduction targets, and states would implement plans to achieve
those goals.121
Almost immediately, the CPP became embroiled in litigation. Twentynine states and over a dozen electric utilities sued, claiming the EPA had
exceeded its authority under the Clean Air Act (CAA).122 Specifically, the
parties asserted that CAA § 111(d),123 which the EPA relied on in issuing
the CPP, did not grant authority to regulate GHG emissions from electric
power plants—and that the CPP was otherwise unlawful.124 In response, on
February 9, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, took the unusual
step125 of issuing a stay enjoining the EPA from enforcing the CPP pending
litigation.126 Consequently, the CPP never took full effect, and 19 states
suspended their efforts to develop individual compliance plans.127
The Trump administration took equally quick action to dismantle the
CPP. The President appointed Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt, a
noted critic of both the CPP and the EPA, to head that agency.128 A week
after the President issued his “energy independence” executive order, the
EPA announced that it was, consistent with that order, conducting a review
of the CPP and providing advance notice of “forthcoming” rulemaking

120 Id.

at 64,665.

121 See

EPA, “Legal Memorandum Accompanying Clean Power Plan for Certain Issues,”
at 1, 6, 23, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/cpp
-
legal
-
memo.pdf.
122 See Robinson Meyer, “The Supreme Court’s Devastating Decision on Climate,” The
Atlantic (Feb. 10, 2016).
123 42

U.S.C. § 7411.

124 Petition

for Review, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2015).

125 This

was the first time the Court had ever blocked an EPA rule using a stay. See Lawrence Hurley & Valerie Volcovici, “U.S. Supreme Court Blocks Obama’s Clean Power Plan,”
Scientific Am. (Feb. 9, 2016).
126 West

Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).

127 See,

e.g., E&E News, “E&E’s Power Plan Hub,” https://www.eenews.net/interactive/
clean_power_plan#planning_status. Twenty-eight states continued their efforts.
128 See Brady Dennis, “Scott Pruitt, Longtime Adversary of EPA, Confirmed to Lead the
Agency,” Wash. Post (Feb. 17, 2017); see also, e.g., Letter from E. Scott Pruitt, EPA Adm’r,
to Hon. Matt Bevin, Governor of Ky. (Mar. 30, 2017) (informing the Governor that EPA’s
policy in light of the CPP stay was that “States have no obligation to spend resources to
comply with a Rule that has been stayed”).
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proceedings reflecting that review.129 Six months later, the EPA proposed
to repeal the CPP altogether.130
In proposing this repeal, the EPA, in a stark about-face, concluded that
the CPP exceeded its authority under section 111(d). This was because, the
agency said, the rule compelled utilities to “change their energy portfolios”
away from GHG-heavy fuels like coal to other alternatives like natural
gas or renewables, rather than following usual agency practice of setting
“emission guidelines” for power plants.131 This was problematic, the EPA
reasoned, because it “necessitate[s] changes to a state’s energy policy,”132
thus extending federal authority too far.
Since announcing this repeal, the EPA has been holding a variety of
public hearings.133 It set January 16, 2018, as the deadline for public comments, which it later extended to April 26, 2018.134 While repeal of the CPP
remains a proposal for now, it is a virtual certainty that litigation will ensue
once the EPA does move forward.135

[5] Vehicle Efficiency Standards
Consistent with the administration’s overall plan to roll back all Obamaera climate regulations, President Trump also has sought to undo his
predecessor’s efforts to increase vehicle efficiency. Following passage of
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007,136 and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,137 the Obama EPA and National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) jointly finalized new
129 See Review of the CPP, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,329 (Apr. 4, 2017). The EPA also withdrew two
CPP-related proposals. See Withdrawal of Proposed Rules: Federal Plan Requirements for
GHG Emissions from Electric Utility Generating Units Constructed On or Before January
8, 2014; Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework Regulations; and Clean Energy
Incentive Program Design Details, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,144 (Apr. 3, 2017).
130 See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
131 Id.

at 48,037.

132 Id.
133 See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 51,787 (Nov. 8, 2017) (announcement of
public hearing).
134 See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 83 Fed. Reg. 4620 (Feb. 1, 2018) (announcement of public
listening sessions and extension of public comment period).
135 See Debra Kahn, “West Coast States Protest Repeal, Threaten Lawsuits,” Climate Wire
(Mar. 1, 2018).
136 Pub.
137 549

L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492.

U.S. 497 (2007).
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Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards requiring car manufacturers to meet fleet-wide efficiency averages of 54.5 miles per gallon
by 2025.138 Addressing climate change was at the heart of this effort. The
agencies estimated that their rule would reduce GHG emissions by an
equivalent of 2 billion metric tons of CO2 and save nearly 4 billion barrels
of oil consumption.139
Less than two months after President Trump took office, however, the
EPA and NHTSA announced their intention to reconsider this Obama-era
rule.140 Although the EPA had decided only months earlier to keep the
standards in place, the March 22, 2017, notice of reconsideration stressed
that agencies have “inherent authority to reconsider past decisions” and
announced a review of the rules to be completed by April 1, 2018.141 The
EPA then opened this review to comment142 and received nearly 300,000
responses.143
A few months later, in April 2018, then-EPA Administrator Pruitt
announced that he was reversing the agency’s prior determination not to
alter the Obama-era CAFE standards.144 Those standards, he said, were
“based on outdated information” and potentially “too stringent.”145 Specifically, he said he had determined that the standards created feasibility
“challenges for auto manufacturers,” raised “potential” safety concerns, and
imposed “significant additional costs on consumers, especially low-income
consumers.”146 Accordingly, the EPA declared the existing CAFE standards “[o]n the whole . . . not appropriate” and announced that it would,
138 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 69,627 (Oct. 15, 2012) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536, 537).
139 Id.
140 See Notice of Intention to Reconsider the Final Determination of the Mid-Term
Evaluation of GHG Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–2025 Light Duty Vehicles,
82 Fed. Reg. 14,671 (Mar. 22, 2017).
141 Id.

at 14,671, 14,672.

142 See

Request for Comment on Reconsideration of the Final Determination of the
Mid-Term Evaluation of GHG Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty
Vehicles; Request for Comment on Model Year 2021 GHG Emissions Standards, 82 Fed.
Reg. 39,551 (Aug. 21, 2017).
143 Meanwhile, NHTSA announced that it would delay implementing increases to civil
penalties for failure to comply with CAFE regulations. See Civil Penalties, 81 Fed. Reg.
95,489 (Dec. 28, 2016) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 578); Civil Penalties, 82 Fed. Reg.
32,139 (July 12, 2017) (delay of effective date).
144 See Mid-Term Evaluation of GHG Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022-2025
Light-Duty Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,077 (Apr. 13, 2018).
145 Id.

at 16,077.

146 Id.

at 16,078.
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with NHTSA, “further explore” new changes via notice-and-comment
rulemaking.147
Within weeks, 17 states plus the District of Columbia challenged the
EPA’s determination in the D.C. Circuit.148 The parties claim that EPA’s
decision is arbitrary and capricious, inconsistent with the agency’s own
regulations, and in violation of the CAA.149
Then, on August 1, 2018, the EPA continued its efforts to roll back
Obama-era CAFE standards. It issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
seeking to amend the requirements for passenger cars and light trucks, by
freezing the standards at 2020 levels through 2026.150

§ 21.04 Hard Look Review
Part of what complicates the nation’s energy future under President
Trump is the filtering lens of administrative law. Indeed, the very process
of de- or re-regulation following a change in presidents inevitably invokes
a host of administrative law principles.151 These run the gamut from procedural hurdles to deference questions under Chevron,152 Skidmore,153 and
their ilk.154
When agencies switch policy positions, however, arguably the most
central doctrine is arbitrary and capricious—or hard look—review.155 This
principle, though flexible, constrains agencies by seeking to ensure that
they both justify their decisions and do not shift course without merit.
Thus, while the judiciary has expressly condoned the practice of agency
policy change—including for political motivations—the executive branch
does not enjoy carte blanche to evolve its policies willy-nilly.

147 Id.

at 16,087.

148 See

Press Release, Office of Governor of Cal., “California and States Representing
Over 40 Percent of U.S. Car Market Sue to Defend National Clean Car Rules” (May 1, 2018);
see also Petition for Review, California v. EPA, No. 18-1114 (D.C. Cir. May 1, 2018).
149 See

Press Release, supra note 148.

150 The

Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986 (Aug. 24, 2018).
151 See generally Bethany A. Davis Noll & Denise A. Grab, “Deregulation: Process and
Procedures that Govern Agency Decisionmaking in an Era of Rollbacks,” 38 Energy L.J.
269 (2017).
152 Chevron,

U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

153 Skidmore

v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).

154 Bowles

v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).

155 See

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Emily Hammond Meazell, “Deference and Dialogue in
Administrative Law,” 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1722, 1733 (2011).
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[1] The Law of Hard Look Review
Hard look review often is taken as a misnomer. This is because the
inquiry’s overarching objective is supposed to focus on whether the agency
took a hard look at the problem, not for courts to do so themselves. The
reality, of course, is that anytime a court overturns an agency’s decision as
arbitrary and capricious, it will feel like the court subjected the agency’s
choice to some amount of searching scrutiny.
Courts recite the arbitrary and capricious standard in a variety of formulations. The classic statement is that an agency fails hard look review
if it has (1) “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,” (2) “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,”
(3) “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency,” or (4) “is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to
a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”156
Thus, there are minimum thresholds an agency must meet for its decision
to pass the arbitrary and capricious threshold. The agency “must examine
the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.”157
It must draw a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.”158 And it “must give adequate reasons for its decisions”159—including explaining itself such that the path of its logic “may reasonably be
discerned.”160
Under this “narrow” scope of review, “a court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency.”161 However, courts do not conduct the
review “merely to rubber stamp agency actions.”162 Instead, the review is
“flexible”163 and acts “as a check upon administrators whose zeal might
otherwise have carried them to excesses”164 by carefully balancing judicial
review and “agency autonomy.”165
156 Meazell, supra note 155, at 1733 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
157 State
158 Id.

Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.

(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).

159 Encino
160 Id.

(1974)).

Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016).

(quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286

161 State

Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.

162 Natural

Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 755 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

163 Natural

Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

164 United

States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950).

165 Albert W. Vanderlaan, Note, “Sending a Message to the Other Branches: Why the
Second and Third Circuits Properly Used the APA to Rule on Fleeting Expletives and How
the New FCC Can Undo the Damage,” 34 Vt. L. Rev. 447, 463 (2009).
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A trilogy of U.S. Supreme Court cases spanning three-and-a-half decades
illustrates the doctrine’s contours.

[a] Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal decision on hard look review is Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.166 This case arose from a regulatory move directly parallel to the Trump
administration’s current efforts. President Reagan’s campaign focused
heavily on a broad promise of deregulation,167 including for automakers.168
In State Farm, the Supreme Court evaluated the permissibility of one such
deregulatory effort: NHTSA’s rescission of airbag and automatic seatbelt
requirements for new vehicles.
Expressly acknowledging that agency rules need not be permanently
engraved in stone, the Court nonetheless overturned NHTSA’s rescission
as arbitrary and capricious. This was for both substantive and procedural
reasons.
First, NHTSA gave no consideration to amending the prior, Carter-era
rule to require that only airbags be used, rather than airbags or automatic
seatbelts.169 The agency’s complete failure to “even consider the possibility” of an airbags-only option, the Court unanimously held, rendered this
deregulatory choice unlawful.170
Second, the Court, by a 5-4 margin, also found the agency “too quick to
dismiss the safety benefits of automatic seatbelts.”171 Specifically, the Court
ruled that while it might have been justifiable to eliminate this rule, the
agency’s record did not support its ultimate conclusion. This was because
theNHTSA neither addressed the difference between detachable automatic and manual seatbelts nor explained why it did not simply require
nondetachable automatic seatbelts.172

166 463

U.S. 29 (1983).

167 See

James F. Blumstein, “Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President:
An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues,” 51 Duke L.J. 851, 859 (2001).
168 See Kathryn A. Watts, “Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review,” 119 Yale L.J. 2, 59 (2009).
169 State

Farm, 463 U.S. at 46.

170 Id.

at 48.

171 Id.

at 51.

172 Id.

at 52–53.
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[b] FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.
Arguably the U.S. Supreme Court’s most important arbitrary and capricious decision since State Farm came in 2009 in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.173 Fox involved mirror image facts to State Farm.
In Fox, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), under President George W. Bush, sought to impose more onerous indecency restrictions on television broadcasters. Specifically, the FCC’s new policy, “for the
first time,” found that nonliteral uses of “the F- and S-Words” during live
television broadcasts “could be actionably indecent, even when the word is
used only once.”174 Despite the agency’s sharp break with past practice, the
Court upheld the FCC’s new enforcement policy.
The Court began by declining the broadcasters’ invitation to impose a
more rigorous standard of review simply because the agency had changed
policy positions. Rather, the Court found “no basis” in the APA or its own
precedent “for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more
searching review.”175 Indeed, as the Court noted, “State Farm neither held
nor implied that every agency action representing a policy change must be
justified by reasons more substantial than those required to adopt a policy
in the first instance.”176
That threshold question settled, the Court found the agency’s new policy
justified by the factual record. The FCC, the Court said, “acknowledged
that its recent actions [had] broken new ground,” and then backed up
that choice with reasons that “were entirely rational.”177 These included
that “[e]ven isolated utterances” can be vulgar and that “a safe harbor for
single words would ‘likely lead to more widespread use of the offensive
language.’ ”178

[c] Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro
Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court completed its hard look trilogy in
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro.179 Unlike State Farm and Fox, this case
involved not the repeal or tightening of a regulation, but rather the sudden
volte-face of one.
173 556 U.S. 502 (2009); see Jodi L. Short, “The Political Turn in American Administrative
Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons,” 61 Duke L.J. 1811, 1813 (2012).
174 Fox,
175 Id.

556 U.S. at 508.

at 514.

176 Id.
177 Id.

at 517.

178 Id.

at 518 (quoting In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licenses Regarding
the Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4979 (2004)).
179 136

S. Ct. 2117 (2016).
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Encino Motorcars arose out of the Obama Department of Labor’s (DOL)
decision to reverse a prior regulation that exempted “service advisors”
at car dealerships from overtime compensation.180 In deciding whether
this policy flip-flop was arbitrary and capricious, the Court reiterated its
stance from Fox: “When an agency changes its existing position, it ‘need
not always provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice
for a new policy created on a blank slate.’ ”181 But, the Court emphasized,
the agency must provide a “reasoned explanation” for its about-face.182
An unexplained inconsistency in agency policy is grounds for judicial
invalidation.183
By a 7-2 vote, the Court found the DOL’s policy reversal unlawful.
First—and unlike the broadcasters in Fox—the retail automobile and truck
dealership industry had relied on the prior DOL rule for decades, negotiating and structuring their compensation plans against the backdrop of that
rule.184 Second—and unlike the FCC in Fox—the DOL “said almost nothing” in the way of “good reasons for the new policy.”185 Instead of offering
a reasoned explanation for its change, the DOL simply asserted that its
regulation was “reasonable.”186 Because “[i]t is not the role of the courts to
speculate on reasons that might have supported an agency’s decision,” the
Court found the new regulation insufficient under hard look review.187

[2] Hard Look Review in Practice
The State Farm trilogy thus established a trinity of principles that guide
arbitrary and capricious review. First, agencies may alter their policies over
time. Second, agencies must acknowledge when they are changing policy
positions.188 And third, agencies must justify their new policies—but the
“reasons for the new policy” need not be “better than the reasons for the
old one.”189
These principles are key to understanding the ground rules that govern
a common situation for agencies: They want to alter, amend, or rescind
180 Id.

at 2123.

181 Id.

at 2125 (quoting Fox, 556 U.S. at 515).

182 Id.
183 Id.

at 2126.

184 Id.
185 Id.

at 2127 (quoting Fox, 556 U.S. at 515).

186 Id.
187 Id.
188 See also Nehemiah Corp. of Am. v. Jackson, 546 F. Supp. 2d 830, 842 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
189 Fox,

556 U.S. at 515.
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existing policy positions, whether because facts have changed, their
approach is not working, or politics have shifted, including through a
change in presidents.190 State Farm, Fox, and Encino Motorcars, however,
only provide an initial glimpse into how stringently courts actually review
changes in agencies’ policy positions.
Here, then, we explore two doctrines that often come into play when
agencies reverse or alter policy: first, that political influence generally
does not expressly factor into courts’ hard look calculus, and second, that
prior factual records and reliance interests may, in effect, constrain agency
leeway.

[a] Political Influence
The U.S. Supreme Court has never fully answered the question of “how
courts should approach agency decisions relying on political pressure
rather than expert analysis.”191 The debate traces to at least State Farm itself.
There, Justice Rehnquist—joined by three other justices—contended that
administrative policy shifts deriving from a presidential change are presumptively justified, because they arguably reflect the democratic choice
of the people.192
Nonetheless, courts typically have not countenanced political motivations in their express arbitrary and capricious analyses.193 Instead, the
question of politics tends to lurk beneath the surface, seemingly influencing courts’ starting points in ineluctable ways, but remaining notably
absent from their explicit focus on the agency record itself.
Thus, more than one commentator has argued for recasting the hard look
standard in light of the role that politics inevitably plays in agency decision
making.194 As then-Professor Kagan suggested, an “alternative” vision of
hard look review “centered on the political leadership and accountability
provided by the President” might offer a more honest appraisal for how
courts actually see these questions.195
Indeed, one possible reading of State Farm is that what the Court really
wanted was for the agency to tell “the full story” and thus “be forced ‘to

190 See

Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2125.

191 Eric Berger, “Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in

Constitutional Decision Making,” 91 B.U. L. Rev. 2029, 2080–81 (2011).
192 Motor
193 See

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983).

Watts, supra note 168, at 6.

194 See,

e.g., Berger, supra note 191, at 2080–81.

195 Elena

Kagan, “Presidential Administration,” 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2380 (2001).
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reveal the political basis for its decisions.’ ”196 Under such a reading, an
agency’s action is more likely to be arbitrary and capricious if it fails to
disclose how politics influenced its decision. Encino Motorcars arguably
underscores this point. As one commentator has noted, that case sent the
message that agencies “can’t just get away with . . . political flip-flops,” especially without justifying them.197
By contrast, other decisions seem to cut wide paths for agencies to
change directions even for overtly political reasons. Fox may lead the field.
As one commentator has suggested, Fox presumptively “makes it easier for
agencies to change their policies” based on politics, particularly since the
dissent there lost the argument that the lack of a higher standard of review
allows regulation to “bend too readily before the political winds.”198
Given this tension in U.S. Supreme Court precedent, it should not be
surprising that courts tend not to focus on political influence in hard look
review, at least at face value. Still, at least one court has struck down as arbitrary and capricious an agency decision where it detected improper political influence. In Tummino v. Torti,199 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York found unlawful the Food and Drug Administration’s
(FDA) refusal to allow women under age 17 to use the Plan B emergency
contraceptive without a prescription.200 The court began by observing that
it is generally unlawful for agencies to act in “subjective bad faith.”201 The
court then found that the FDA had displayed a “lack of good faith,” in part,
because it acted pursuant to “pressure emanating from the White House”
and anti-abortion constituents rather than making its own decision based
on the facts.202 Specifically, the court noted that the FDA Commissioner
had discussed the pending decision with a subordinate who was in contact
with the White House, and then “made [the] decision before FDA staff had
completed their scientific reviews of [the] data.”203
196 Kathryn A. Watts, “Controlling Presidential Control,” 114 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 743–44
(2016) (quoting Lisa Schultz Bressman, “Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law,” 107
Colum. L. Rev. 1749, 1783 (2007)).
197 Dialogue, “The Future of Administrative Law: DOJ/ENRD Symposium on the Future
of Environmental Law,” 47 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10185, 10193 (2017) (statement
of Professor Richard J. Pierce, Jr.).
198 Watts, supra note 168, at 10; see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 547
(2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
199 603 F. Supp. 2d 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), amended sub nom. Tummino v. Hamburg, No.
1:05-cv-00366, 2013 WL 865851 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013).
200 Id.

at 546.

201 Id.

at 542.

202 Id.

at 544.

203 Id.

at 530.
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Tummino has been characterized as an unusual case, and it may be.
Nonetheless, the case offers a toehold for other courts to strike down
agency actions where political influence appears to be driving the result.204
How far that reasoning can extend is the question. At least some observers think not far. As two commentators recently argued: “So long as agencies can articulate some reasoned defense based on statutory terms, even
if some political factor drove the decision, courts can manage to ignore
politics. The charade disintegrates only when the agency has no facially
plausible alternative story it can tell.”205
In short, while political influence may well color how a court engages
in hard look review, relying on that idea as the sole rationale for attacking
agency policy flip-flops is not a path well-trodden in administrative law
jurisprudence.

[b] Prior Factual Records and Established
Expectations
While State Farm and its progeny appear to embrace—rather than
resolve—the tension over how much politics may drive agency decision
making, courts have developed a corollary doctrine that may nevertheless constrain agencies seeking to alter their approach based on politics.
In such cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled, agencies must provide
a more detailed justification if either of two circumstances exist: (1) the
“new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy,” or (2) the prior policy has created “serious reliance
interests.”206
The factual finding point manifests in the contrast between State Farm
and Fox. In State Farm, NHTSA failed hard look review because it “did not
address its prior factual findings.”207 By contrast, in Fox, the FCC’s policy
flip-flop passed muster because the agency “did not base its prior policy on
factual findings.”208

204 Contra Cook Inlet Beluga Whale v. Daley, 156 F. Supp. 2d 16, 22 (D.D.C. 2001)
(although political considerations may have affected the decision not to list the Cook Inlet
Beluga Whale under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the evidence “did not establish
that, but for ‘politics,’ the whale would have been listed under the ESA or that political
considerations became part of the decision making process”).
205 Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, “The Lost World of Administrative Law,”
92 Tex. L. Rev. 1137, 1168 (2014) (footnote omitted).
206 FCC
207 Id.

v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).

at 538 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

208 Id.
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Organized Village of Kake v. USDA209 provides another example. That
case arose out of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) 2001
“Roadless Rule,” which “limit[ed] road construction and timber harvesting in national forests.”210 The USDA originally found that exempting
the Tongass National Forest “would risk the loss of important [ecological] values.”211 But in 2003, after President George W. Bush’s election, the
agency—relying on the same 2001 record—reversed course and found it
“unnecessary” to apply the rule to the Tongass National Forest.212 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found this reversal arbitrary and
capricious. The USDA, the court said, relied on “factual findings directly
contrary” to its 2001 findings, without providing a “reasoned explanation”
for that choice.213 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the broader
political context: “There was a change in presidential administrations just
days after the Roadless Rule was promulgated in 2001. Elections have
policy consequences. But, State Farm teaches that even when reversing a
policy after an election, an agency may not simply discard prior factual
findings without a reasoned explanation.”214
The U.S. Supreme Court also has held that where a prior policy “has
engendered serious reliance interests,” the agency must offer a reasoned
explanation for disregarding those interests.215 This rule seeks to balance
the “unfairness” of the policy change with “the government’s interest in
applying its new view.”216
Again, the contrast between two cases from the Supreme Court’s hard
look trilogy illustrates the point. In Encino Motorcars, the Court found the
DOL’s policy change arbitrary and capricious in part because “[d]ealerships and service advisors [had] negotiated and structured their compensation plans” according to the agency’s prior position.217 However, in Fox,
209 795
210 Id.

F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2015).

at 959.

211 Id.

at 960 (quoting Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244,
3254 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294)).
212 Id. at 962 (quoting Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Applicability to the
Tongass National Forest, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,136, 75,137 (Dec. 30, 2003) (to be codified at 36
C.F.R. pt., 294)).
213 Id. at 968; cf. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1038 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
214 Vill.

of Kake, 795 F.3d at 968.

215 FCC

v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).

216 Ronald

M. Levin, “Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television,” 65 U.
Miami L. Rev. 555, 567 (2011).
217 Encino

Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016).
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the Court sanctioned wide ground for the FCC to change positions, no
doubt in part because the “transition costs resulting from reliance on the
former fleeting-expletives policy were not significantly involved . . . .”218
Likewise, in Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, the court pointed to reliance interests as key to its conclusion that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction of the Trump administration’s attempted termination of the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.219 That program allows
“certain individuals without lawful immigration status who entered the
United States as children to . . . . work, study, and keep building lives in
this country.”220 Noting the extensive reliance interests of DACA recipients’
families, employers, and educational institutions in shaping their lives,
careers, and futures, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York found this alone “sufficient to render [the Department of Homeland
Security’s] supposedly discretionary decision to end the DACA program
arbitrary and capricious.”221

[3] Hard Look Review and the Trump Energy Policy
Implementation of the Trump administration’s energy policy has already
put a tangle of legal issues before the courts.222 These judicial dustups are
likely to become only more prevalent and complex with time. They are
complex in part simply because of the vastness of the Trump administration’s efforts. Yet they are also complex because of how hard look review
tends to be implemented in practice. In this vein, how the administration’s
energy policy will fare before the judiciary on hard look challenges reduces
to two key questions.
The first is whether the openly political nature of the administration’s
policies will help or hurt it. As precedent shows, politics can cut both ways.
As the State Farm dissent recognized, policy shifts that trace directly to
presidential elections gain some legal cover from the idea that an election
reflects the democratic will of the people—or, at least, that electoral ritual
can partially legitimize agencies’ policy shifts. On the other hand, even as
courts generally are reluctant to expressly address politics as a formal part
of their arbitrary and capricious analysis, the reality may be that courts
come at cases with a different orientation when it is clear politics undergirds their decision more than anything else. This may be in part because
218 Levin,
219 279

supra note 216, at 567.

F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).

220 Id.

at 406–07.

221 Id.

at 431.

222 See

Lisa Heinzerling, “Unreasonable Delays: The Legal Problems (So Far) of Trump’s
Deregulatory Binge,” 12 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 13 (2018); Noll & Grab, supra note 151.
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agencies’ political motivations may incline them to play faster and looser
with the facts. It also may be part of the explanation for studies that have
shown higher affirmance rates by Democratic judicial appointees of “liberal” agency decisions, and vice versa.223 The smell of politics (or politics
they dislike) puts judges’ antennae up.
What is less clear is whether it is politics itself that gives courts umbrage,
or if it is agency disingenuousness that invokes judicial skepticism when
politics is involved—because the agency says it is acting for one reason
but it obviously is acting for another. The medicine here is clear. Agencies
and courts both should own up to what role politics plays in their decision
making, so that the merits can be dealt with out in the open rather than
through a distorted lens, or in code. Past administrations typically have
not deemed it wise to be so brazen.224 However, the Trump administration
appears already to be expressly invoking politics to justify its administrative decisions to some degree.225
Of course, merely acknowledging the role of politics in their decisionmaking processes will not inoculate agencies from legal barrage, even if
it may give them credit with the court for fair dealing. They still have to
justify their choices. That, then, leads to the second question.
That question is whether any hard look review tripwires will hobble the
Trump administration’s energy efforts. At the outset of addressing this
question, it is critical to emphasize that if hard look review is anything, it
is highly granular, fact-specific, and context-dependent.226 So, just because
one Trump regulatory U-turn survives judicial scrutiny does not mean
another, even related, effort will as well.
What we can say is that, tactically at least, the Trump administration’s
repeal-everything-as-fast-as-possible approach has something to commend it. It renders arguments that the Obama-era rules need to stay in
place because parties have detrimentally relied on them difficult indeed.
These rules were not around long in the first place, and now, their shelf life
already has been called into question.

223 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, “The Real World of Arbitrariness Review,” 75
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review” depends, among other things, on the “impartiality of the agency as regards the
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Where the Trump administration will have more trouble, then, is in procedurally and substantively justifying what it is doing on energy. Courts can
be persnickety on agency procedure, especially when they sense something
else is awry,227 and the Trump administration has already run into trouble
on these grounds. Twice, in fact, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California rejected the BLM’s efforts to delay the Waste Prevention Rule because the agency did not adequately explain itself.228 As one
commentator has suggested, the administration’s explanations for why it
needs to delay Obama-era rules have seemed rushed and slapdash across
the board, not just on energy—and often with reasoning that is “entirely
circular: the agency needs to delay the effective date because the agency
needs to delay the effective date. Stating a conclusion is not the same as
explaining it.”229
Substantiating new or different energy rules may pose an even higher
hurdle for the administration, at least in some cases. This is the hard look
game. State Farm and its progeny expressly contemplate that agencies will
change their policies, including for political reasons. Agencies, however,
must then substantively justify their new policies as both legal and good.
This is the hard work of the administrative state. It involves evidence and
technical expertise and minutiae, all while acknowledging and addressing
the impacts that proposed rules will have on society. Undoing prior rules,
in other words, is entirely feasible. But the more well-built the prior rule is,
the more difficult it is to undo—and the more quickly that work of rescission is done, the more likely it will not be up to par.
Certainly, the Trump administration inevitably will ground some of its
choices in fact sufficiently to emerge from the gauntlet of judicial review.
The Obama administration had good reasons for withdrawing federal
lands from coal leasing, for instance, but those reasons do not foreclose
others that might lead to an opposite conclusion. On some such decisions,
Congress intentionally has given agencies wide berth, expecting that they
will exercise their expertise or balance the public interest in a way that
matches society’s evolving needs over time. In such circumstances, courts
are less likely to intervene.
In other cases, though, the factual record built by the Obama administration will be more difficult to discard.230 NHTSA has some leeway in
227 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015); see also Louis J. Virelli III, “Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review,” 92 N.C. L. Rev. 721, 743 (2014).
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deciding how aggressive vehicle efficiency standards should be, but the
EPA’s finding that GHG emissions from mobile sources endanger public
health and welfare rests on much more than a thin reed. Reversing that
conclusion—or finding that electricity-sector GHG emissions need not be
regulated, even if the President believes climate change is a “hoax”—will
not be an easy task. The science simply points the wrong way. Likewise for
onshore oil and gas: It may be that the Trump BLM can explain why the
Obama BLM had it wrong on fugitive methane emissions, especially if it
makes a new case for how the balance of public benefits and regulatory
compliance costs comes out differently. But suggesting that natural gas on
federal lands simply should be burned off at the same time the administration is clamoring for more domestic fossil fuel production—that logic
would seem harder to sell.
Much of courts’ hard work in the energy realm in the coming years,
then, will be carefully examining each of these claims, deciding where the
Trump agencies’ records stack up and where they do not. The courts will
engage in this endeavor against the broader backdrop of the hard look
standard—a standard that is designed to often defer to agencies. No doubt,
the Trump administration knew this as it developed, planned, and then
implemented its energy policy. Prior studies have shown that agencies
enjoy quite successful records in the courts against arbitrary and capricious
challenges. Agencies’ chances at prevailing may be as high as 90% in the
Supreme Court231 and 70–75% in the various circuits of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals.232 Moreover, as one commentator has shown, even when a court
invalidates an agency’s decision as arbitrary and capricious, that is not the
end of the matter. Rather, agencies have a strong record of resuscitating
their policies in these circumstances, successfully re-implementing their
policies “in approximately 80% of the instances in which courts have originally remanded rules as arbitrary and capricious.”233 Although, on average,
it takes an agency two years to do this, in more than half of the cases analyzed, it took “less than a year.”234

231 See

Adrian Vermeule, Law’s Abnegation 191 (2016).

232 See

Frank B. Cross, “Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals,” 91 Calif.
L. Rev. 1457, 1503 (2003); Miles & Sunstein, supra note 223, at 767; David Zaring, “Reasonable Agencies,” 96 Va. L. Rev. 135, 173 (2010); see also Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule,
“Thin Rationality Review,” 114 Mich. L. Rev. 1355, 1358 (2016).
233 William S. Jordan, III, “Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal
Rulemaking?” 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 393, 440 (2000).
234 Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=345

§ 21.05

Trump Energy Policy

21-37

In short, the battle over what the nation’s energy policy will be going forward will not stop with hard look review in the courts. It may well simply
pause—or begin again—there.

§ 21.05 Conclusion
The Trump administration wants an energy future that turns heavily
back to the past. It seeks to return U.S. energy policy to a metamorphosed
version of what existed prior to the Obama administration—a policy
focused on domestic energy sources, domestic energy production, and
achieving a new world order where the United States not only uses fossil
fuels ubiquitously at home but dominates global exports of them. This is a
policy, the administration says, not of domestic energy independence but
of U.S. energy “dominance.”
Whether the Trump administration will achieve such ambitious aspirations is highly questionable. Its policy play swims against quite strong realworld currents that have emerged in the energy sphere in the last decade,
including the burgeoning emergence of renewables, increased emphasis
on efficiency, and global pressure to address climate change. More directly,
the implementation of this policy already has faced substantial legal pushback—and will only face more. To date, the Trump administration has
notched both victories and significant defeats on this front. Many of these
future challenges will turn on legal questions other than hard look review,
but there is no question that doctrine will play a heavy role going forward.
In this regard, if past is prologue, the future of the Trump energy policy
is murky at best. Courts have been reluctant to rely solely on the political nature of policy flip-flops to overturn them as unlawful, but the more
political such choices are, the more searching scrutiny they may receive.
And the Trump energy policy is—more than anything else—political at
its core.
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